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Meeting the Challenge of Cyberterrorism:
Defining the Military Role in a Democracy

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr:

H

eadline grabbing events like the denial of service attacks1 on "dot com"
companies2 in early 2000 and the excitement over 1999's Y2K fears 3
have served to tum public and governmental attention to the vulnerability of
computers in an increasingly network-dependent, infonnation-oriented
society. For their part, militaries-and especially the US anned forces-have
for some time been grappling with the implications of the metamorphosis
spawned by the enonnous advances in computer technologies of the last
twenty years. A general consensus exists that emerging digital capabilities are
stimulating what is popularly known as a "Revolution in Military Affairs," or
RMA.4 There are many aspects to the RMA,5 but few would dispute that one
progeny is the rise of infonnation operations (10)6 as a specific military
discipline.
In fact, the threat of cyberattack as a fonn ofrO is a major concern of the
US anned forces. In its doctrine, the military gives the defense of infonnation
systems open and prominent attention.7 In military circles, 10 is viewed as
an asymmetric strategy because it presents an opportunity for an adversary
with a narrow capability to successfully strike a seemingly more powerful
opponent like the United States. One commentator eA-plains this phenomena
as follows:
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Meeting the Challenge of Cyberterrorism
No other country or group can approach the US conventional-weapon
superiority. This is why many terrorists find information terrorism an attractive
alternative to traditional forms of terrorism. eyber-terrorism allows
terrorists-both foreign and domestic-to inflict damage with no harm to
themselves and litde chance of being caught. It is a way for the "weak" to attack
the "strong," particularly to disrupt a stronger force at a key time during an
operation. 8

The threat of cyberterrorism as a form ofIO is especially troublesome to the
US armed forces because it can strike at vital systems not under military control.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has officially acknowledged that today it is
"dependent upon non-DoD assets-the international and national infrastructures, [and] other facilities and services of the private sector,"9 and these could be
targets of cyberattacks. The Air Force admits that this "Achilles' heel of the
United States can be the great equalizer for a militarily inferior adversary."10
Still, "cyberterrorism" as a term of art does not, per se, find a home in the
Pentagon's lexicon. 11 "Terrorism," however, is e}..1'licitly defined. The DoD
describes it as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological."12 Cyberterrorism might therefore be understood as using digital
technologies to achieve the aims of traditional terrorism.
The purpose of this essay is to briefly outline the military's response to the
threat of cyberterrorism, and to examine some of the emerging policy issues attendant to that response. In addition, I will discuss a few issues associated \vith
using the tools ofthe cyberterrorist against America's enemies, and the complications that doing so presents to democratic societies. In addressing both these perspectives, I will be more concerned with identifying areas for further study than
with presenting refined solutions. Having said that, I will attempt to anchor the
discussion wherever possible in the context ofAmerican democracy and how it
should shape the role ofthe military in addressing the dangers ofcyberterrorism.

The Military Response
For at least five years, uniformed leaders have publicly discussed the vulnerability to cyberattack on the digital networks upon which the military relies. 13
Yet according to policy in place since 1995, the responsibility for the security of
critical non-DoD "information systems and computer-based systems and networks that can be distributive in nature" remains with civilianIaw enforcement
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authorities. 14 Nevertheless, the DoD "must be prepared, in concert with the
appropriate authorities and within defense priorities, to assist in their protection" if the attack on the systems "seriously degrades or threatens DoD operations."15
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, issued in May of1998, 16 provides
a conceptual basis to e:h.-pand DoD's responsibility. In that document DoD was
designated as the "lead agency" in the area of "national defense" with responsibility for "coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in
that area."17 PDD 63, however, left the scope of "national defense" undefined.
In addition, PDD 63 established the National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), an organization physically located within the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI).18 NIPC brings DoD together with "representatives from the
FBI, other US government agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector."19 NIPC also serves as the US Government's "focal point for threat
assessment, warning, investigation, and response for threats or attacks against our
critical infrastructures. "20
Paralleling these developments, the individual military services have taken
steps to enhance defenses against cyberattacks. In 1993 the Air Force established
the Air Force Information Warfare Center with the explicit mission of protecting friendly command and control systems. 21 The other services have likewise
planned to confront a cyberadversary.22 Further, the National Security Agency
(NSA), an element of the Department of Defense, is tasked with an "information assurance mission."23 In executing that mission, NSA "conducts defensive
information operations, to achieve information assurance for information infrastructures critical to US national security interests." 24
In order to further coordinate the military response,Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense OTF-CND) was formed in early 199925 with a charter
to orchestrate the protection of all DoD computer systems. 26 In a move to
bolster its effectiveness,JTF-CND was placed under the control of US Space
Command (USSPACECOM) in October of 1999. 27 At the same time, the
Joint Information Operations Center was placed under SPACECOM control.28
In another effort to increase its resources against cyberattack, the Defense Computer Forensics Lab was established in September 1999. 29 It aims to facilitate,
among other things, the tracing across the Internet ofhackers who threaten DoD
systems.30
Finally, Joint Task Force-Civil Support GTF-CS), an organization assigned
to US Joint Forces Command, was established not to defend DoD systems per se,
but to assist civilian authorities in managing the consequences of any catastrophic
act of terrorism, including cyberterrorism. In announcing the new task force,
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DoD conceded that the benign title of "civil support" and the selection ofa National Guardsman instead of a Regular officer as the commander were both intended to quell the concerns of civil libertarians who feared that the "DoD was
out to take over and would trample people's civil liberties" with the new organization.31
Although the armed forces were quietly developing an offensive 10 capability for some time, it has only recently been discussed openly. Offensive 10
embodies activities such as "operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, physical destruction and special information operations, and could include computer network attack."32 These
types of operations present a plethora of complex legal issues, and practical
problems as well. DoD has admitted to Congress that during Operation
ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo "the conduct of integrated information operations was hampered by the lack of advance planning and necessary strategic
guidance."33 In order to better focus the offensive information operations effort, General Richard Meyers, the commander of USSPACECOM, announced in January 2000 that effective October 1, 2000 the command will
"pick up the computer network attack mission."34

The Emerging Policy Issues
Clearly, the US military aims to protect itselfagainst cyberterrorism, facilitate
a broader defense of US interests against that threat, and employ cybertechnology as a means and method of warfare, albeit for a presumably more
righteous purpose than the cyberterrorist. What kind of policy issues should we
expect to see?
Background
Before considering the specific issues associated with the role of the military
in defending against cyberattacks, it is important to understand that in the US
there is a generally accepted division oflabor on security issues. As a rule, civilian
law enforcement agencies handle internal security, while the primary purpose of
the military is, as the Supreme Court put it in Totlt v. Quarles, "to fight or be
ready to fight wars should the occasion arise"-ordinarily an extemally focused
endeavor.35 The tradition of ordinarily excluding the military from performing
policing duties is traceable to the Founding Father's deep-seated suspicion of
professional militaries. 36 That suspicion resulted from their cognizance of the
excesses ofCromwell' s New Model Army in England, as well as their loathing of
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British regulars used to suppress the colonists' growing protests against imperial
rule. For these and other reasons, the scheme for national security found in the
Constitution principally contemplates not the large standing forces we have today, but a rather small number ofregulars augmented by huge state militias. 37 In
short, in practical terms it is doubtful that the Founding Fathers ever envisioned
a standing anny large enough to function as any kind ofpolice force on a reguJ.ar
basis.
While the US military has been used successfully from time to time to quell
civil disorders that overwhelm civilian resources, the record ofthe relatively few
times it has been used for an extended period for a law enforcement-type mission is less than sanguine. Indeed, it was the intemperate behavior of Federal occupation troops during the post-Civil War Reconstruction Era that led to the
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act in 1878.38 The Act-which criminalizes the
use of the military to enforce the law absent specific authority-remains the
principle limitation on the employment of the anned forces for internal security
purposes.
Of course, the Posse Comitatus Act is not intended to frustrate the military's
ability to engage in bona fide national security-related activities. Exacdy what
constitutes a national security activity appropriate for military attention, however, became blurred during the Cold War, and especially during the domestic
unrest of the Vietnam era. The result was an unwholesome involvement of the
military establishment in the personal affairs ofthousands oflaw-abiding US citizens. Professor LochJohnson reports, for example, that "NSA computers were
fed every single cable sent overseas by Americans from 1947 until 1975 [and]
Anny intelligence units conducted investigations against 100,000 Americans
during the Vietnam War. "39
The excesses of military and civilian intelligence agencies during this period
led to Senate investigations in the 1970s (the Church Committee)40 and substantial restrictions on the ability of military organizations to scrutinize US citizens. 41 Nevertheless, by the early 1980s the nation's drug crisis led Congress to
enact a number of measures to involve the military in efforts to halt the tide of
narcotics flowing into the country and to help stem the crime explosion catalyzed by illicit drugs. 42 While the anned forces are still generally prohibited
from such activities as conducting searches and seizures and effecting arrests, the
military counterdrug effort-especially in technical support and border surveillance activities-amounts to billions of dollars and involves thousands of unifonned personnel.
As a result ofsuch initiatives, the traditional reluctance to employ the military
in a domestic security role appears to be eroding. 43 Regrettably, however,
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incidents occur that demonstrate that the skills of the soldier are not necessarily
coterminous with those ofthe policeman. For example, the tragic 1997 shooting
of a Texas high school sophomore by a Marine Corps border surveillance patrol
may well illustrate that the orientation of the armed forces leads its members to
deal with perceived threats differendy than do law enforcement personne1. 44
This difference produces a very distinct approach to security problems.
As a general rule, soldiers move on threats by fire and maneuver with a view
towards permanendy eliminating them; police forces attach the presumption of
innocence towards suspected lawbreakers and seek to resolve incidents peacefully with the ultimate disposition left to the courts. It should be no surprise,
therefore-given the military's perspective-that a Pentagon-sponsored report
argued that the Pentagon's "policy of prohibiting DoD from mounting a counter cyberattack if its computers are attacked puts the military at risk."45 In responding to the report's proposal to allow the military to immediately launch a
counterattack, John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists quipped,
"Does this mfXUl that the Pentagon will start frying the home PCs of American
teen-age hackers?"
According to a 1999 Harris poll,46 the armed forces enjoy a status as the most
trusted institution in American society. In my opinion, few activities could
jeopardize that trust more than an increased involvement in law enforcement
and related activities that cause military personnel to intrude into the lives ofeveryday Americans. It would not seem to make sense, therefore, to involve military personnel in controversial proposals such as the Federal Intrusion Detection
Network (FIDNET). 47 In an era when the US remains obliged by world events
to maintain a still sizeable military establishment, and one that is now an
all-volunteer professional force, the maintenance of harmonious civil-military
relations ought to be a prime concern ofdemocratic leaders. This is especially so
given the troubling reports of a growing estrangement of the US armed forces
from the nation it serves, notwithstanding the public's evident affection for
those in uniform. 48

Defending Against Cyberthreats
These lessons of the past are worth considering as we develop policies on
the military's role in fighting cyberterrorism. Most experts agree that the nature
of cyberterrorism is such that it is extremely difficult-at least initially and often
later, if ever-to distinguish between the teenage hacker on a digital joy ride,
the high-tech felon on a crime spree, the non-State cyberfanatics seeking to
intimidate, and the nation-State waging information warfare. Moreover,
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the clever cyberterrorist can often employ techniques that make it appear
that innocent parties are the instigators of whatever chaos they manage to
wreak. Thus, a military organization involved in investigating an attempted act
of cyberterrorism could well find itself mistakenly probing innocent persons.
Even when the guilty party is correcdy identified, it may often be one more
properly falling within the jurisdiction of a law enforcement agency, not a military force.
Consequendy, the current policy that assumes-at the outset anyway-that
an act of cyberterrorism is a criminal matter subject to law enforcement modalities as opposed to a hostile attack calling for a response by the armed forces seems
appropriate. Moreover, military leaders-to include former Deputy Secretary
of Defense John Hamre-have repeatedly emphasized that DoD is not seeking
an active role in law enforcement in response to the terrorist threat. 49 Still, relative to the military, police resources are limited and diffused over thousands of
jurisdictions. While this state ofaffairs may be satisfactory in the context ofordinary crime fighting requirements, it may be unacceptable if cyberterrorism presents a threat of truly catastrophic dimensions as some have claimed.
The magnitude of the cyberthreat has much to do with the appropriateness of
a military response. A recent study50 of the Posse Comitatus Act in relation to
the protection ofmilitary and civil infrastructure against digital attack concluded
that the military may conduct what might otherwise be considered prohibited
law enforcement activities under certain circumstances. Specifically, action
against civilians consistent with the act can occur when, inter alia, an "emergency" exists or when the activity is primarily in pursuit of a "military purpose. "51 Accordingly, "ifthe primary purpose ofan action is to resolve or avert a
problem with a strong tie to national security, the military purpose exception [to
the Posse Comitatus Act] may be invoked."52
This brings us almost full circle to the central issue: when does cyberterrorism
rise to the level of a true national security threat? We seem to accept almost
\vithout question the assertion that the US is "extraordinarily vulnerable" and
that "an enemy could systematically disrupt banking, transportation, utilities,
finance, government functions and defense."53 To listen to many pundits, the
US is virtually at the mercy of any teenager with a Radio Shack computer. The
reality, I contend, is much different. Specifically, I believe that cyberterrorism-particularly when conceived exclusively in terms of computer network attack intended to cripple the nation's economy or military forces-is
much more difficult to accomplish.
To put it blundy, if cyberterrorism were so easy and cheap to do, why have
we not seen a catastrophic event? If not in the US, anywhere? This is much the
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same point that Rand analyst and cyberwar expert Martin Libido wrote about in
Foreign Policy. 54 In this regard, I think it would be a mistake to make too much of
the past denial-of-service attacks on commercial sites. In the first place, most
sites were impeded for only a short time, leading many experts to characterize
the incidents as "little more than criminal mischie£"55 Ironically, the attacks
may have caused little revenue loss. Newsweek wryly noted that since" dot-coms
typically lose money on every sale they make, they might come out ahead" as a
result of the attacks. 56
As Libicki observes, there is a great difference between public commercial
websites, and the sensitive military and civilian infrastructure operating systems
whose incapacitation on a grand scale might stagger even a country like the
United States. However vulnerable the former, the latter are much more secure
and, in any event, often operate in a dosed loop, independent mode requiring
unique expertise even if access is somehow achieved. This is a key reason why,
for example, Bruce F. Wollenberg, a professor of electrical engineering at the
University ofMinnesota, insists that the US power grid "isn't hacker friendly. "57
Dan Kuehl, a respected professor at the National Defense University, argues
that the reason a full-fledged cyberattack has not been launched is "solely because no state or non-nation state actor has yet seen sufficient strategic advantage
to be gained by doing so-and this condition will not last indefinitely."58 I disagree because I believe the requisite e:lq)ertise is much rarer than many assume,
and much of that e}"'Pertise is on the side of the good guys. We live in a world of
Saddam Husseins, Slobodan Milosevics, and Osama bin Ladens, who are
hell-bent to inflict harm upon us in any way they can. These are people to whom
the logic of "strategic advantage" is e}"'Pressed in the most savage acts of terror
they can manage to accomplish. They are smart, ruthless, moneyed, and motivated, yet have not achieved a crushing cyberassault.
We tend to discount too readily our own defensive capabilities. Recall that
much was made of the supposed "hacker" capabilities of the allegedly computer-literate Serbs and others during the Kosovo campaign. Evidently, they
tried hard. According to Lieutenant General William J. Donahue, "hackers
came at us daily, hell-bent on taking down NATO networks."59 Yet, the end
result was failure: no NATO combat deaths, and a near-zero effect on the ultimate military outcome. Similarly, despite all the allegations of rampant, damaging attacks in the private sector, the reality is that the US economy continues to
roar. Are we to believe that there are thousands ofmalicious people ,vith diverse
agendas at scores oflocations around the globe fully capable of devastating us
with keystrokes who are collectively refraining from doing so because of some
serendipitously uniform appraisal of "strategic advantage"? My assessment of
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human nature leads me to conclude otherwise. In short, they "would if they
could-but they calt't."
Let me emphasize that I certainly do not counsel indifference; I recognize that
cyberattacks will succeed occasionally. Collectively, they are cosdy-$7.6 billion in 1999 by one estimate. 60 Thus, I think the Clinton Administration's proposal to spend some $2 billion on various computer security programs is a
prudent and affordable insurance policy for the nation. 61 I merely point out that as
sizeable as the estimated cyber losses are, they must be understood in the context of
a country that each year suffers more than $150 billion in costs from motor vehicle
crashes alone 62-not to mention over 40,000 deaths, and in excess of6 million injured. 63 I simply caution that we should not unnecessarily divert resources from
other pressing needs based on what may be an mistaken analysis of the threat.
Moreover, in calculating the dimensions of our potential cyberterrorism
problem we should not underestimate the power of our capitalistic free market
system to find solutions. In a very real way, America's military prowess is largely
the product of its economic success. Given that business to business online sales
are e:l..'Pected to grow to $1.3 trillion by 2003,64 there is a immense incentive for
the commercial development of reliable computer security technology for online transactions.
I believe the tremendous market imperative for secure transactions-and the
incentive it creates for effective computer security products65_will rapidly outstrip the resources of individuals or even governments to create methodologies
capable of circumventing improved defensive measures. In discussing the
long-term threat after the denial-of-service attacks in early 2000, one commentator maintained that" [w]ith money at stake, e-businesses will fix this glitch. "66
Overall, I find persuasive Libicki's view that our "enemies best time to conduct
information warfare has clearly come and gone."67 All of this is yet more evidence that it is unnecessary at the present time to involve the military in
cyberdefense any more than it is presendy tasked.
To me, the real danger is not so much that cyberterrorists will use the Web
as a vehicle for destructive computer network attacks, but rather that they will
employ it as a convenient source ofinformation useful for a variety of nefarious
purposes. For example, I am convinced that cyberterrorists could gather
enough personal information from Web sources to intimidate and harass individuals or even groups of individuals in the military and elsewhere. This is one
reason that the DoD has begun to limit the amount ofinformation ~vaila~
public sites. 68 At least in the near term, however, the damage ha; been done.
There is sufficient information already on the Internet for those disposed for
whatever purpose to engage in such crimes as identity theft. 69 In fact, I believe
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this problem is getting so difficult to rectify that in the not too distant future,
courts will be adjudicating "identity replacement" much as they now do in bankruptcy cases. Still, these cyberthreats are, in my view, properly within the responsibility--and growing capability--oflaw enforcement agencies to resolveJO

Avoiding the Cyberterrorist Label
.&; important as it is to defend against cyberattacks, it is equally important to
ensure that our own security activities avoid accusations that we ourselves are
engaging in cyberterrorism. In a very real sense, the flip side of cyberterrorism is
the use ofcybertechniques for legitimate offensive IO. From the military perspective, the means and methods of the cyberterrorist are not necessarily malum itt se;
rather, they must be tested against existing domestic and international law applicable ante bello as well as in bello. Along this line, in 1999 the Office of the DoD
General Counsel issued its :first unclassified assessment of the legal aspects of
information operationsJl In other words, to the military way of thinking,
cyberterrorism is objectionable because ofits purposes and the '1}antter in which
it is employed (e.g., against noncombatants and noncombatant objects), not,
per se, because of the techniques themselves.
Still, there are many legal and policy questions yet to be resolved. For example,
what constitutes, in the layman's vernacular, the proverbial "act of war"? That
is, what measure ofpeacetime cybermanipulation is tolerable before it amounts to
a "use offorce" or "armed attack" that plunges a nation into conflict?72 While the
definitive answer yet eludes us, there is a growing consensus that once the cyberassault creates consequences indistinguishable from that of a traditional kinetic
attack, the legal status of the cyberevent becomes likewise the same. 73 Conversely, it appears cyberevents that do not reach that threshold would not therefore constitute aggression within the meaning ofthe UN Charter (although they
may be violative of other aspects of international or domestic law)J4
Reference to the UN Charter raises the larger issue of the wisdom of various
suggestions for an international agreement addressing cyberterrorism. Some of
these, like the Stanford proposal,75 explicidy exclude "activities undertaken by
military forces of a State party, or State party activities during armed conflict. "76
Others, like the reported Russian proposal, contemplate banning certain information weapons altogether. 77 Many would agree that there is a need for greater
international cooperation to confront the unique issues presented by cyberterrorism78 and that cooperation may need to take the form of an international
agreement. That said, we ought to be cautious about entering into legal regimes
that may unnecessarily hamper what is, after all, an area where the US, as the
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world's foremost digital power, may itselfhave an asymmetric advantage across
the spectrum of conflict.
To the extent news reports are reliable, the Kosovo conflict raised a number
ofinteresting issues about the use ofcybertechniques during armed conflict. For
example, early in the campaign it was reported that a civilian US hacker sent a
denial-of-service e-mail "bomb" that flooded the Serb Government website
with 500,000 e-mails, crashing the site.79 Is this person an unlawful combatant
under international law? Likely. A cyberterrorist? Perhaps.
Additionally, it was widely reported in the press that senior policymakers did
not approve a planned cyberassault ofMilosevic's personal bank accounts. 80 I do
not know ifsuch a plan ever existed, let alone the reasons it was not executed. 81
Ifit did exist, however, one can imagine that a key issue would be the propriety
ofstriking the private property ofa civilian,82 notwithstanding his position as the
head of State of a belligerent. Given the growing aversion in the international
community to the use of destructive, kinetic weapons in war that may cause civilian deaths, it may be useful to re-examine the prohibition against targeting of
civilian objects via cybertechniques ifbloodshed can be avoided through this
kind of coercion. John Markoff, writing in the New York Times, argues that
"cyberwarfare raises a fundamental philosophical question ... the biggest challenge that such warfare may pose for democratic societies is that it further blurs
the distinction between military and nonmilitary targets. "83
There are other complex issues occasioned by emerging cyber capabilities for
the armed forces of a democracy: In the US military, 10 embraces a wide range
of technology-empowered activities. Psychological operations, for example, are
important to the military commander imbued in the Clausewitzean tradition to
believe that the ability ofan adversary to wage war depends upon the support of
the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the armed forces. 84
Disassembling the enemy's trinity, that is, undermining his will while preserving
one's own, is an accepted military objective. 85
Some emerging cybertechniques present exciting opportunities for the military professional to sap an enemy's resolve with relatively litde violence. 86 As
Hollywood has repeatedly demonstrated, the ability to use digital means to
morph or otherwise create extremely convincing-but false-images is now
\videly available. 87 Considering such capabilities, Thomas Czerwinski, then a
professor at the National Defense University, posed an interesting question:
"What would happen if you took Saddam Hussein's image, altered it, and projected it back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?"88
Quite obviously, it could deceive a population about its leaders, as Professor
Czenvinski indicates.
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Few would call such efforts against a totalitarian or wholly depraved regime
"cyberten;orism." A different issue arises, I believe, when the hostile government is a genuinely democratic one. Consider that if Internet-based voting-which the US military is experimenting with today89-becomes
widespread, the potential exists to manipulate elections in enemy countries during armed conflict via cybersubversion of the voting process itself
Would such an operation be appropriate in light of US national security policy that promotes democracy?90 I do not think so, even though I am not an adherent to the democratic peace theory.91 Based on my own experience in
Somalia and elsewhere, I find Professor Samuel P. Huntington's" clash of ch>ilizations" thesis far more convincing. 92 I accept that there are entire societies that
hold values fundamentally different from our own-and they would freely vote
to retain those values-even though the policies they produce may lead to conflict with the US or other Western nations. 93 Nevertheless, I also believe that
democracy ought not to be asked to "pay for itself," so to speak, by necessarily
producing peace.
Democracy as an expression of the principle ofself-determination found in the
UN Charter94 and elsewhere has an intrinsic human value independent of any
peace-generating quality. Accordingly, is it right to apply cybertechniques
against an adversary's democratic processes, even in time ofwar? Certainly it is appropriate to act to control the hostile acts of any government, democratic or otherwise. It seems to me, however, that care must be taken to distinguish between
the use of cyberweapons to address the actions of a democratic government, and
employing them to undermine the democratic processes that produced it.
Michael Walzer, perhaps the premier ethicist on issues ofwar and peace, gives
us another matter to consider. He points out that, excluding exceptional cases
like Nazi Germany, war aims "don't legitimately reach to the transformation of
the internal politics of the aggressor state or the replacement ofits regime. "95 In
other words, we must be very cautious in employing advanced digital methodologies that may destroy the confidence of people in democratic processes.
Consider also the other vital part of the Clausewitzean trinity: maintaining
the will ofthe publics ofJriendly countries. 96 This is especially a concern for democratic countries, and it was raised during the Kosovo operation. You may recall
that Serb radio and television stations were bombed in attacks highly criticized
by Human Rights Watch97 and others. 98 In my opinion, the attacks were
warranted99 since it appears that the facilities were used to whip up ethnic hatred
for years. 100 As Air Commodore David Wilby, a NATO spokesman, eA-plained
on April 8, 1999, "Serb radio and TV is an instrument of propaganda and repression.... It is ... a legitimate target in this campaign." 101 Since, inter alia,
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incitement to genocide may itselfbe a war crime,102 Wilby's assertions seem to
have merit, assuming the other prerequisites of the law of armed conflict were
met.
If cybertechniques can neutralize the facilities without the physical destruction conventional munitions cause, we should embrace netwar as a development that could reduce the misery of war. Suppose, however, that the enemy
radio and television stations were transmitting not propaganda, per se, but accurate information about US operations that nevertheless was eroding support
among our public or that of allied democracies?103 For example, in a report on
the attacks on Serb television stations, Patrick L. Sloyan observed that while
bombing stopped the "diet of lies fed Serb viewers," it also served to "curb
transmission to the West of those disturbing 'collateral damage' pictures that
could erode public support for NATO's escalating strikes in the Balkans."104 If
addressing the latter concern were the sole aim--as opposed to, for example, the
limited notion of preserving operational security in a particular circumstance--would the attacks be justified? Probably not.
Censorship and exclusion ofthe press from military operations has long been tolerated in liberal democracies during wartime. lOS Essentially, where there is a demonstration that the information would present a clear and present danger to national
security, it could be suppressed. 106 That concept, however, would not seem to permit the suppression of news reports-via cyberassault or other means--simply because the information conveyed would tend to demoralize public opinion in our
own country, or that of our allies. Democracy, I believe, has its price.

Concluding Observations
If this brief survey has succeeded, the reader will appreciate that the issues
raised by cyberterrorism are many and complex. At the present time, law and
policy carefully circumscribe the military's role, and to date DoD has been careful to stay ,vithin those limits. 107 There are, however, calls for expanded responsibility. Some suggest a relaxation of the policy that presumes atleastinitially that
a cyberattack is a civilian law enforcement problem, not a national security issue. 10S Doing so, it is contended, would allow that application of the considerable resources of the military and intelligence communities that currendy are
barred from use in most domestic cases involving US persons. 109
To this end, one innovative proposal calls for a policy that presumes the digital "intruder is not a US person," thus permitting "the full capabilities of the
United States' investigative and intelligence assets" to be brought to bear.ll0
However, this reversal of the present presumption would apply only to attacks
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against specified systems that are deemed by statute to be critical to the nation's
economic and national security interests. 111 Whether such an approach is politically feasible depends upon public perceptions. As already indicated, what role,
ifany, the military should play in defending against domestic cyberattacks is embedded in the larger issue regarding the extent to which Americans believe their
way of life is put at risk by the potential of cyberterrorism.
In this regard, I would add one final note ofcaution. I have often heard a variety of senior Pentagon 112 and national security officials l13 insist that the US is
susceptible to an "electronic Pearl Harbor." Conjuring up emotional images of
the infamous sneak attack that pulled the US into World War II is certainly an effective way to hype the interest of persons both in and out of uniform towards
greater vigilance and preparedness. The analogy is one plainly worth pondering,
especially as our society becomes increasingly digitally dependent.
There is, however, a very dark side of the Pearl Harbor story that we should
also keep in mind. As a result of the fears generated, the US military-acting in a
domestic security role-rounded up thousands ofloyal American citizens and
placed them in detention camps, all in the name of responding to a threat to national security. We know today that the sacrifice of the rights of Japanese-Americans was wholly unnecessary. Although it may be fashionable these
days to say that the roundups were simply racism run amok, those that have actually read Korematsu v. United States, 114 as well as ChiefJustice Rehnquist's discussion in his recent bookl15 may conclude otherwise. From those sources one can
reasonably conclude that principled men struggling with a real fear of invasion
by an enemy who had already demonstrated his treachery at Pearl Harbor made
what they sincerely believed was a unavoidable decision-however wrongheaded it appears with the benefit of hindsight.
But, in a sense, the fact that respectable people were nevertheless responsible
for the treatment of Japanese-Americans that we now find so objectionable
should itselfgive us pause. As we consider the growing involvement of the military in countering cyberterrorism, we must never forget that the armed forces is
the least democratic and most unapologetically authoritarian element of our society. I hasten to add that this does not presume anything sinister about those in
uniform or those that advocate an enhanced role for the military in fighting
cyberterrorism. I merely submit that in a democracy, and especially American
democracy, the machinations of the truly evil are, somewhat paradoxically, frequently more readily corrected than are the misdirected efforts of wellintentioned, honorable citizens.
Pearl Harbor and the sacrifices that followed in its aftermath remain a lesson
for us as we consider what role, if any, the military should play in countering
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cyberterrorism. On a deeper level we must accept that perfect security is fundamentally at odds with democratic values. This applies as much to cyberterrorism
as to any other threat against us. We must be prepared to take prudent risks in order to have a free society. The inescapable truth is that we must likewise acknowledge that from time to time our freedom will exact a harsh price from us
and those we love.
Nevertheless, we must not allow the dread of digital terror to drive us to take
counsel ofour fears. As Martin Van Creveld and others have pointed out, terrorism has not succeeded in developed States because it is a characteristic ofmodernity to have a robust level oftechnological redundancy and political resiliency so
as to make individual terrorist attacks relatively futile in terms ofreal effect on capability.116 While cyberterrorists might be able to inflict costly losses periodically, they cannot physically imperil our continued existence as a free nation.
Indeed, the real risk is upon those who challenge the forces offreedom. As Professor Victor Hanson explains in his book, Soul ofBattle, 117 history shows that the
forces of democracies once aroused are extraordinarily fearsome combatants who,
nOt\vithstanding the seeming empowering militarism of the opposing forces,
tend to not merely defeat the armies of despots, but to pulverize them and everything that supports them. So profound is such defeat that the very societies that produced the forces of tyranny are left fundamentally changed and virtually
unrecognizable to their former masters. The enemies of democracies ought to
take note.
In summary, the true threat is not what damage cyberterrorists can inflict
upon our digital systems, but what freedoms they can force us to forfeit. The San
Francisco Chronicle, citing a report by the Commission on National Security121st
Century,118 editorialized that "terrorist hackers" and other threats "will probably put pressure on the military to move into domestic law enforcement, blurring the line bet\veen domestic and foreign threats."119 It soberly warned "it is
better to live \vith danger than in the security ofa police State. "120 Although we
are certainly not yet living in the shadow ofa police State, it is a timely reminder
of what is really at stake.
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